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UNSTABLE FOOTING: SHELBY COUNTYS MISAPPLICATION
OF THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
Austin Graham*
The general government will, at all times, stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments;and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government.
 Alexander Hamilton1
The Constitution assigns states the power to regulate The Times, Places and
Mannerof federal elections but permits Congress discretion to override state determinations on the subject.2 States have wider autonomy in establishingtheir internal
votinglaws and qualifications.3 Generally, the Tenth Amendment4 is regarded as the
constitutional root of this authority.5
The VotingRights Act of 19656 (VRA)fundamentally altered the traditional allocation of electoral control between the federal government and the states. Under the
Act, certain states and political subdivisions were required to submit all proposed electoral legislation to federal officials for approval before such laws could take effect. 7
* J.D. Candidate 2015, William and Mary Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Rebecca Green for her assistance in completingthis Note.
1
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 228(Alexander Hamilton)(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
& Co. 1864).
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1.
3
See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400U.S. 112, 125(1970)(No function is more essential to
the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power
to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for
state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for fillinglocal
public offices.);Boyd v. Nebraska, 143U.S. 135, 161(1892)(Each State has the power
to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen,
and the title to offices shall be tried, whether in the judicial courts or otherwise.).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. X (The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.).
5
Mitchell, 400U.S. at 12425([T]he Framers of the Constitution intended the States
to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.
(footnote omitted)). The Guarantee Clause also is considered a source of state power and a
handicap on the federal governments ability to control state elections. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§4;see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2223(1988).
6
42U.S.C. §§19731973bb-1(2006).
7
See infra Part I.B.
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At the time of the Acts passage and for many years after, this departure from the tradition of state control was j
ustifiable as a remedy for the systematic scourge of racial
discrimination in voting.8
In Shelby County v. Holder,9the Supreme Court dismantled the VRAs most stringent regime by invalidatingthe coverage formula employed to bringjurisdictions
under federal oversight.10 While Shelby County restored a more balanced allotment of
electoral control, the decision recurrently referenced the principle of equal sovereigntyof states as a restraint on the federal governments ability to disparately regulate states.11But this concept of equal state sovereignty does not have the constitutional
foundation implied by Shelby County.12There does exist an equal footingdoctrine that
superficially bears some semblance to a principle of equal sovereignty. 13 The equal
footingdoctrine generally prohibits Congress from abridgingthe sovereignty of new
states through conditions in acts admittingthem to the Union.14 Outside the context
of state admissions, however, the equal footingdoctrine has never limited Congresss
ability to impose discrepant obligations on states through legislation.15
Shelby County was a patent misapplication of the equal footingdoctrine. This Note
proffers a three-factor explanation for the Courts decision to utilize the doctrine as
j
ustification for invalidatingthe VotingRights Acts coverage formula. First, precedent
had cabined the Courts capacity to annul the coverage formula with more established
constitutional principles, so the Court had to reach for precedential support peripheral
to the context of votingrights litigation. Second, the equal footingdoctrines varied
historical applicability engendered flexibility in the doctrine that allowed for its use in
the domain of votingrights litigation. Third, the Court did not actually employ the equal
footingdoctrine in Shelby County, and instead cited the doctrines precedent as constitutional beddingfor a discrete concept of state dignity as sovereigns.
This Note commences with an overview of the VotingRights Acts structure and
Court decisions interpreting it. Section II summarizes the equal footing doctrines
meaningand historical application. Section III posits an explanation for the Courts
decision to employ the equal footingdoctrine in Shelby County. The obj
ect of this Note
See City of Rome v. United States, 446U.S. 156, 182(1980)(Congressconsidered
determination that at least another 7years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter
the perpetuation of 95years of pervasive votingdiscrimination is both unsurprisingand
unassailable.);South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)(The Voting
Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting,
which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.).
9
133S. Ct. 2612(2013).
10
Id. at 2631.
11
See infra note 137.
12
See infra Part II.B.
13
See infra Part II.B.
14
See infra Part II.B.
15
See infra Part II.B.
8
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is not to assess the rectitude of Shelby Countys invalidation of the VotingRights Act
coverage formula. Rather, the aim is to illustrate Shelby Countys flagrant misapplication of the equal footingdoctrine.
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
A. Background to the Enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
A century after the Civil Wars culmination, racial discrimination continued to
endure in the United States, particularly in the South.16 The realm of elections was
especially rife with inequity. Discriminatory votinglaws were pervasive as Southern
states unremittingly flouted the mandates of the Fifteenth Amendment through measures designed to inhibit African American participation in the electoral process.17
Discriminatory voting devices, frequently in the mode of literacy tests and poll
taxes, were a particularly effective method of denyingminority suffrage.18 Initially,
Congress tried to fight racial discrimination in votingon a case-by-case basis and
through expansion of the statutory mechanisms available to challenge votinglaws.19
These attempts by Congress20 and federal courts21 foundered, though, as Southern
states interminably circumvented federal commands.22
Beginningin the late 1870s, many states codified Jim Crow laws sanctioningracial
segregation in virtually all societal contexts. David Pilgrim, What was Jim Crow?, FERRIS
STATE UNIV. (Sept. 2000), http:/
/www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/
what.htm.
17
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 31011(1966).
18
Id. at 31112. Some officials encouraged outright violence to stymie African American
participation in elections. On the eve of Wilmington, North Carolinas mayoral election in
1898, a candidate urged white voters to [G]o to the polls tomorrow and if you find the negro
out voting, tell him to leave the polls, and if he refuses[,]kill him;shoot him down in his
tracks.Michael James Burns, Note, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act:
Getting the Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 227(2012)
(quotingSTEWART E. T OLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE:AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882193067(1995)).
19
The Civil Rights Act of 1957established the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice, which was authorized to challenge the constitutionality of barriers to minority
electoral participation. Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5of the
Voting Rights Act: The Need for A Revised Bailout System, 30ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9,
13(2010);see also Sudeep Paul, The Voting Rights Acts Fight to Stay Rational:Shelby
County v. Holder, 8DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POLY SIDEBAR 271, 271(2013)(notingTitle
I of Civil Rights Act of 1964expedited votingcases to three-judge federal panels).
20
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78Stat. 241(codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §2000a (2006));Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, 74Stat. 86(codified as
amended at 42U.S.C. §1971(2006));Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71Stat. 634
(codified as amended at 42U.S.C. §1971(2006)).
21
See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364U.S. 339(1960);Terry v. Adams, 345U.S. 461
(1953);Guinn v. United States, 238U.S. 347(1915).
22
See Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 314(1966).
16
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By 1965, Congress was exasperated with the Souths sustained exclusion of
African Americans from the electoral process.23 In January and February of 1965,
Martin Luther King, Jr. organized marches designed to highlight the systematic denial of African Americansvotingrights in Alabama.24 On March 7, 1965, state police
seekingto dissolve a protest assaulted demonstrators with tear gas and clubs.25 Fifty
demonstrators were hospitalized, and the assault, dubbed Bloody Sunday,brought
national attention to the scourge of racial discrimination in the Deep South.26 Bloody
Sunday decisively showcased the need for robust federal legislation to protect minority
votingrights in the South, and Congress responded with the VotingRights Act of
1965, a complexscheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where votingdiscrimination ha[d]been most flagrant.27 Using its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
authority,28Congress intended the VRA to finally bringto fruition the Constitutions
command that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridgedbecause of race.29
B. Structure of the Voting Rights Act
The VRAs provisions are divisible into two categories:(1)permanent measures
applicable across the nation, and (2)temporary remedial measures targeted against
j
urisdictions with the most flagrant histories of votingdiscrimination.30 On a national
scale, Section 2prohibits any votingpractice that results in a denial or abridgment
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.31
Sections 3, 6(a), and 13(b)provide procedural mechanisms for challengingvoting
laws.32 Sections 11and 12impose civil and criminal sanctions for interference with
rights protected by the Act.33 Section 10, in essence, invalidates the use of poll taxes
throughout the country.34
See id. at 315.
Jessie Kindig, Bloody Sunday, Selma, Alabama (March 7, 1965), BLACKPAST, http:/
/
www.blackpast.org/aah/
bloody-sunday-selma-alabama-march-7-1965(last visited Oct. 23,
2014).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 315.
28
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §2(The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1(The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.).
30
Burns, supra note 18, at 23132.
31
VotingRights Act of 1965§2(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973a (2006)).
32
Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 316.
33
Id.
34
VotingRights Act of 1965§10(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973(h)(2006)).
23
24
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The temporary measures are more formidable. Perhaps the Acts strongest
provision is Section 5.35 Under the Section 5framework, a covered jurisdiction must
submit any proposed alteration to its votinglaws to the Justice Department or to the
D.C. District Court for preclearance before such change can take effect. 36 The jurisdiction has the burden of demonstratingthat its proposed change will not have a retrogressive effect on minority votingstrength.37 The Justice Department or the D.C.
District Court will deny preclearance if the proposed change has the purpose or effect
of denyingor abridgingthe right to vote on account of race or color.38 A voting
change abridges the right to vote if it diminishes a minority groups ability to elect
[its]preferred candidates of choice.39
The procedure for determiningwhich states and jurisdictions were covered by
preclearance was diagrammed in Section 4(b), a provision known as the coverage
formula.40 Under the original coverage formula, any state or jurisdiction that incorporated votingtests or devices41 as of November 1, 1964, and had less than fifty
percent of its votingage population registered to vote as of November 1, 1964, or
experienced voter turnout of less than fifty percent in the 1964presidential election,
was subject to Section 5preclearance.42 Congress deliberately reverse-engineered
the coverage formula, such that it pinpointed jurisdictions where it believed voting
discrimination was most pervasive, and then concocted a formula to bringsuch j
uris43
dictions into preclearance coverage.
Upon takingeffect, the coverage formula ensnared a sizeable portion of the South:
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and twenty-six
counties in North Carolina all immediately fell into coverage.44 Alaska, three Arizona
counties, and single counties in Hawaii and Idaho, respectively, also were determined
to satisfy the formulas criteria by the end of 1965.45 Subsequent amendments to the
VRA brought additional states and j
urisdictions into coverage.46 By 2013, nine states
Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 31516.
VotingRights Act of 1965§5(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973c (2006)).
37
See Beer v. United States, 425U.S. 130, 141(1976)([T]he purpose of §5has always
been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.).
38
42U.S.C. §1973c(a)(2006).
39
Id. §1973c(b).
40
See Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 317.
41
Tests or devices triggering statutory coverage included literacy tests, grandfather
clauses, property qualifications, and good-morals requirements. Burns, supra note 18, at 233.
42
Id.
43
See Paul, supra note 19, at 27778.
44
Katzenbach, 383U.S. at 318.
45
Id.
46
See William S. Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder:The
Restoration of Constitutional Order, 20122013CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 3738(2013).
35
36
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in their entirety were subject to preclearance:Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.47Additionally, California,
Florida, Michigan, New York, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and South Dakota all
contained political subdivisions subject to preclearance.48
States or jurisdictions that do not meet the coverage formulas criteria still can fall
into the preclearance regime through Section 3s bail-in procedure.49 Accordingly,
a jurisdiction is bailed into preclearance if a federal district court finds that the jurisdiction is intentionally denyingcitizensconstitutional votingrights.50 Implementation of the bail-in provision is infrequent, though, as courts require a showingof
intentional discrimination before coverage can attach.51
Conversely, covered states and j
urisdictions can escape their preclearance obligations through Section 4(a)s bailout provision.52 Under Section 4(a),a covered jurisdiction can obtain a declaratory j
udgment from the D.C. District Court releasingit from
preclearance if the jurisdiction demonstrates compliance with the VRAs mandates,
and otherwise has maintained a clean record with respect to votingrights duringthe
precedingten years.53 Although bailout provides a seemingly attractive escape mechanism from preclearance, in practice, only a fraction of covered jurisdictions have
Burns, supra note 18, at 236.
Id.
49
VotingRights Act of 1965§3(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973a(c)(2006));see also Paul,
supra note 19, at 274.
50
See Paul, supra note 19, at 274.
51
See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Acts Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation
and Dynamic Preclearance, 119YALE L.J. 1992, 2009(2010).
52
VotingRights Act of 1965§4(a)(codified at 42U.S.C. §1973b(a)(1)(2006)).
53
Id. Christopher B. Seaman summarizes the bailouts statutory requirements in An
Uncertain Future for Section 5of the Voting Rights Act: The Need for A Revised Bailout
System. See Seaman, supra note 19, at 2526. To achieve bailout, a jurisdiction must demonstrate that duringthe ten years prior to seekingthe declaratory judgment:
(1)it has not used a discriminatory test or devicewith the purpose or
effect of denyingor abridgingthe right to vote;
(2)no final court judgments, consent decrees, or settlements have been
entered against it for discriminatory votingpractices;
(3)no federal examiners have been sent to the jurisdiction;
(4)the jurisdiction, and all governmental units within its territory, have
complied with Section 5, includingthe submission of all election changes
for preclearance and the repeal of all changes to which objections were
issued;and
(5)no objection has been entered by the Department of Justice or the
U.S. District Court to any change submitted by the jurisdiction and any
governmental unit within its territory.
In addition, the jurisdiction was required to demonstrate it had taken
affirmative steps to expand minority participation in the electoral process.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
47
48
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achieved bailout.54 In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One, Chief
Justice Roberts attributes the bailout provisions underutilization to perceptions that
its statutory requisites are inordinately burdensome.55
C. Amendments to the VRA
Upon passingthe VRA in 1965, Congress initially intended for the temporary
provisions, includingSections 5and 4(b), to expire in five years. 56 But Congress
subsequently has amended the Act four times since 1965, simultaneously extending
the temporary provisionsduration and wideningthe VRAs scope.57 The VRA was
first amended in 1970, the year in which the Acts temporary provisions were scheduled to expire.58 The VotingRights Act Amendments of 1970prolonged the temporary provisionsapplicability for five more years.59 The 1970 amendments also
tweaked the coverage formula, and preclearance expanded to any jurisdiction that
employed a votingtest or device as of November 1, 1968, and had voter registration
or turnout for the 1968presidential election below fifty percent of its votingage population.60 The amended coverage formula captured jurisdictions in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wyoming.61
The temporary provisions again were extended in 1975, this time for seven
years.62The VotingRights Act Amendments of 1975further broadened the coverage
formula such that preclearance applied to any jurisdiction that maintained a voting
test or device as of November 1, 1972, and had voter registration or turnout below
fifty percent for the 1972presidential election.63 As a result, the states of Alaska,
Arizona, and Texas all became subject to statewide preclearance, as did political
subdivisions in California, Florida, Michigan, NewYork, North Carolina, and South
Dakota.64The 1975amendments additionally expanded the VRAs protection to language minorities.65 The definition of votingtest or device now encompassed the furnishingof English-only votingmaterials in jurisdictions with substantial non-English
Id. at 11;see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 211
(2009)(observingthat only 17of 12,000-plus covered jurisdictions had successfully bailed
out of coverage).
55
Nw. Austin, 557U.S. at 199(As enacted, §§4and 5of the VotingRights Act were
temporary provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years.).
56
Paul, supra note 19, at 276n.44.
57
Burns, supra note 18, at 228n.9.
58
Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 37.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 3738.
62
Id. at 38.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
42U.S.C. §1973b(f)(2)(2006);see Burns, supra note 18, at 234.
54
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speakingminority populations.66The 1975amendments stand as the last time Congress
substantively altered the coverage formula.67
The VRAs temporary provisions, in accordance with the 1975amendments, were
set to expire in 1982.68 In the lead up to the provisionsscheduled expiration, Congress
debated whether preclearance was still necessary in light of the considerable advances in minority electoral participation precipitated by the VRA.69 In decidingto
reauthorize the provisions, Congress took note of a tactical shift evident in covered
jurisdictions.70 Largely because of the VRAs mandates, jurisdictions had moved
away from so-called first-generation barriers to minority electoral participation,71
which were the impetus for the VRAs original enactment.72 Congress found jurisdictions instead were utilizingmore nuanced second-generation barriers, such as atlarge votingschemes and dilutive redistrictingplans, to minimize the political heft
of minority voters.73The prevalence of second-generation barriers convinced Congress
that preclearance remained a necessary mechanism to protect minority voters.74 Thus,
Congress extended preclearance and its coverage formula for twenty-five years.75
The VRAs most recent reauthorization occurred in 2006.76 Prior to passingthe
2006amendments, Congress engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the VRA that generated over 12,000pages of evidence and witness testimony.77 All parties agreed the
Act had proven highly effective in eliminatingfirst-generation barriers to minority
voting.78 Minorities had realized enormous progress in political participation, as evidenced by registration rates, election turnouts, and political representation within covered jurisdictions.79 Minoritiesincreased electoral participation spawned debate as to
whether Congress finally should permit the VRAs temporary provisions to expire.80
Burns, supra note 18, at 234.
Id.
68
See Seaman, supra note 19, at 21.
69
Id. at 23.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Paul, supra note 19, at 279.
73
Seaman, supra note 19, at 23.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 24.
76
Burns, supra note 18, at 232.
77
Seaman, supra note 19, at 3637.
78
See Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 201(2009)(The historic
accomplishments of the VotingRights Act are undeniable.).
79
See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, H.R. REP. NO. 109-478§2(b)(1)(2006)
(certifyingVRA had precipitated monumental increases in numbers of registered minority
voters, rate of minority voter turnout, and minority political representation).Duringthe 2004
presidential election, African Americans actually had higher voter registration and turnout
rates than white voters in some covered states. Nw. Austin, 557U.S. at 201.
80
Seaman, supra note 19, at 3435.
66
67
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But the persistence of second-generation barriers81 troubled Congress.82 Reauthorizations proponents felt federal oversight was still warranted as a variety of factors
evinced.83 Renewals supporters stressed that preclearance deterred covered jurisdictions from otherwise instigatingdiscriminatory votinglaws.84 These supporters
thereby won the day, and both the Senate and House overwhelmingly voted in favor
of reauthorization.85 The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
VotingRights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006prolonged application of the VRAs temporary provisions for another twenty-five years, lockingin
preclearance until 2031.86
The 2006amendments produced two notable substantive changes to Section 5,
which were formulated in response to a pair of Supreme Court decisions limiting
preclearances application.87First, Congress amended Section 5s language such that
a votingchange with the purpose or effect of diminishinga minority groups ability
to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote.88
Second, Congress added a provision explicating that the meaning of purpose
within Section 5included any discriminatory purpose.89
Although Congress bolstered preclearances statutory reach in 2006, the coverage formula remained static.90 Whether a jurisdiction was subject to preclearance
still hinged on election data from 1964, 1968, and 1972.91 A group of Republican
Second-generation barriers dilute a minority groups votingpower so as to inhibit their
ability to elect favored candidates. Common second-generation barriers include at-large voting
schemes, annexations, and multi-member districts. H.R. REP.NO. 109-478§2(b)(4)(A)(2006).
82
Id. §2.
83
See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 39. These factors included racially
polarized votingin covered jurisdictions, the Justice Departments continued issuance of
Section 5preclearance objections, the numerous filings of Section 2litigation in covered
jurisdictions, and the filingof enforcement actions to protect language minorities. H.R. REP.
NO. 109-478, at 23.
84
Seaman, supra note 19, at 3334.
85
The Senate unanimously passed reauthorization, while the House of Representatives
voted in favor of reauthorization by a vote of 390to 33. Burns, supra note 18, at 232n.33.
86
See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 38.
87
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539U.S. 461, 463(2003)(holdingthat an assessment of
whether a redistrictingplan results in retrogression of minority groups effective exercise of
electoral franchise depends on all relevant circumstances, and not only on comparative ability
of minority group to elect its candidate of choice);Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528U.S.
320, 341(2000)([W]e hold that §5does not prohibit preclearance of a redistrictingplan
enacted with a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose.).
88
42U.S.C. §1973c(b)(2006).
89
Id. §1973c(c).
90
See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 39.
91
Id. Professor Richard Hasen, a prominent election law scholar, was an unexpected advocate for readjustingthe coverage formula. See An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions
of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 217(2006)(statement of Prof. Richard Hasen)
81
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congressmen did propose an update to the coverage formula that would have incorporated election data from the 1996, 2000, and 2004presidential elections in lieu of the
older data.92 In the proposed formula, a jurisdiction would fall into coverage if it employed a discriminatory votingtest or had voter turnout below fifty percent in any of
the last three presidential elections.93The proposed formula, though, was not included
in the final amendments, due to concerns about its constitutionality.94
D. Supreme Court Interpretation of Section 5Through Northwest Austin
For nearly fifty years, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the VRAs temporary provisions, justifyingits holdings on both congressional evidence and judicial
deference.95 The Court traditionally evaluated challenges to the preclearance regime
under a lenient rational basis standard of review, maintainingthat Congress may
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.96
South Carolina v. Katzenbach97 is the granddaddy of all preclearance litigation.
Immediately after the VRA became effective, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of assorted VRA provisions as overextensions of Congresss power and
encroachments onto state sovereignty.98 The Court principally regarded the challenge
as an issue of whether Congress properly acted within its constitutional authority in
enactingthe VRA.99 In resolvingthis question, Katzenbach laid down the standard
of review that would safeguard the VRA for nearly a half century:As against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.100The Court expounded
that the mandates of the Fifteenth Amendment supersede[]any contrary exertions of
state power101 and Congress, charged with enforcingthe Fifteenth Amendment, has
full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.102 To support its reasoning, the Court conjured Chief Justice John
(Congress should update the coverage formula based on data indicatingwhere intentional
state discrimination in votingon the basis of race is now a problem or likely to be one in the
near future.).
92
See Seaman, supra note 19, at 3839.
93
Id. at 39.
94
Id. Constitutional concerns about the proposed coverage formula centered on its projected coverage of jurisdictions without notable histories of votingdiscrimination. Hawaii,
for instance, was the only state qualifyingfor statewide coverage. Id.
95
Paul, supra note 19, at 27677.
96
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 324(1966).
97
Id. at 301.
98
Id. at 323.
99
Id. at 324.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 325.
102
Id. at 326.
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Marshalls eminent language from McCulloch v. Maryland:Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.103
After establishingits standard of review, the Court assessed the constitutionality
of Section 4(b)s coverage formula. The Court was satisfied Congress had sufficient
evidence to conclude that j
urisdictions covered by the formula had engaged in system104
atic discrimination. The Court recognized that Congress purposefully devised a formula to pull particular j
urisdictions into preclearance by pinpointingthe two invidious
characteristics they all shared:utilization of discriminatory votingtests and devices,
and a votingrate in the 1964presidential election substantially below the national
average.105 The Court accepted both characteristics as relevant to discrimination and
held the coverage formula rational in both practice and theory.106
Followingreview of the coverage formula, the Court evaluated Section 5with
similar deference. Though concedingpreclearance may have been an uncommon
exercise of congressional power,the Court asserted that exceptional conditions
can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.107 The Court acknowledged covered jurisdictionscontinuous evasion of prior federal efforts to expand
minority electoral participation and recognized that such jurisdictions likely would
attempt more elusion in the future.108 In light of the circumstances, the Court concluded Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.109Katzenbach thereby
gave preclearance, and its coverage formula, a powerful endorsement of constitutional validity, and the opinions reasoningremained the linchpin of federal courts
interpretations of the preclearance framework for decades.110
FollowingKatzenbach, the Court continued to uphold the constitutionality of
the preclearance regime. Allen v. State Board of Elections111clarified that preclearance
was not limited to state legislation concerningvoter registration and extended to
any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a
Id. at 326(quotingMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17U.S. (4Wheat.)316, 421(1819)).
Id. at 32930.
105
Id. at 330.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 334.
108
Id. at 335(Congress knew that some of the States covered by §4(b)of the Act had
resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contrivingnew rules of various kinds for the sole
purpose of perpetuatingvotingdiscrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.
Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers in the future
in order to evade the remedies for votingdiscrimination contained in the Act itself.(footnote omitted)).
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., Lopezv. Monterey Cnty., 525U.S. 266, 28485(1999);City of Rome v. United
States, 466U.S. 156, 17980(1980).
111
393U.S. 544(1969).
103
104
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minor way.112 The Court thereby construed Section 5as defendingagainst attempts
to dilute the votingpower of minority groups.113
Georgia v. United States114 reiterated the Courts broad interpretation of preclearances function. The Court held that preclearance was mandated for covered
statesreapportionment plans,115 iteratingits explanation from Allen that Section 5
was applicable to any votingchange with the potential to dilute minority voting
strength.116The Court discarded Georgias as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5in a single sentence referencingKatzenbach:And for the reasons
stated at length in South Carolina v. Katzenbach . . . we reaffirm that the Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under §2of the Fifteenth Amendment.117
In City of Rome v. United States,118the Court rej
ected the argument that Section 5
does not prohibit votingpractices with a discriminatory effect alone, and held that a
grant of preclearance demands absence of both discriminatory effect and purpose.119
The city claimed that the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly barred only purposeful racial
discrimination in voting, so Congress could not prohibit votingpractices devoid of
discriminatory intent even if such practices produced a discriminatory effect.120
The Court conceded that even if the Fifteenth Amendment facially proscribes only
purposeful discrimination, precedent construingCongresss Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority foreclosed any argument that Congress could not allow voting
modifications with only a discriminatory effect.121 In support of its position, the Court
reiterated its unstintingunderstandingof Congresss enforcement authority under the
Civil War Amendments.122 In the Courts view, the Civil War Amendments were
specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state
sovereignty,such that they permitted Congress to intrude on state and local electoral control.123 Fifteen years after the VRAs enactment, City of Rome verified the
Courts sustained acceptance of the preclearance regimes constitutionality.
Lopez v. Monterey County124indicated the Courts complacence with preclearance
nearly three decades after its initial expiration was supposed to occur. Federalismbased arguments against the Acts constitutionality still proved futile. [T]he Voting
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 566.
Id. at 569.
411U.S. 526(1973).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
446U.S. 156(1980).
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 17478.
Id. at 17980.
525U.S. 266(1999).
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Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment
permits this intrusion . . . .125
Northwest Austin126 is notable for dicta probingthe constitutionality of preclearance. For the first time in over forty years, the Court appeared troubled both by preclearances discrepant application amongjurisdictions, and the coverage formulas
reliance on decades-old data.127 A reverence for state sovereignty was evident in the
Courts language:[A]departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statutes disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets.128 While the Court punted on the question of
preclearances constitutionality by determiningthe district was eligible for bailout,129
Northwest Austin was a harbinger of the Courts attitude toward the modern constitutionality of the preclearance regime.
E. Shelby County v. Holder
Shelby County, Alabama had been subj
ect to preclearance upon the VRAs initial
130
enactment in 1965. Unlike the district in Northwest Austin, Shelby County was
ineligible for piecemeal bailout because of several VRA infractions committed in the
county duringthe precedingten years.131 Shelby Countys constitutional challenge to
the preclearance framework ensued in 2010, after the county sought a declaratory
j
udgment that the preclearance regime was unconstitutional.132 Shelby County especially focused its attack on the coverage formula, which it considered the most viable
avenue for disablingthe preclearance regime since annulment of the formula would
allow the Court to avoid the overarchingissue of Section 5s constitutionality.133
Id. at 28485.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193(2009).
127
Id. at 203(The evil that §5is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the
jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. The statutes coverage formula is based on data
that is now more than 35years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account
for current political conditions.).
128
Id.
129
Id. at 205, 211.
130
See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 41(Shelby County became a covered
j
urisdiction not by virtue of any discriminatory conduct on its own part, but because it is located
in a fully covered state:Alabama.).Alabama was amongthe states covered under the 1965
Act. See supra note 44and accompanyingtext.
131
See Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 42. Shelby County and its political subdivisions submitted 682votingchanges to the Justice Department between 1965and 2012. Of
these 682proposed changes, the Justice Department objected to five. Paul, supra note 19,
at 275.
132
Consovoy & McCarthy, supra note 46, at 42.
133
Id. at 43.
125
126
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After lower courts rejected Shelby Countys challenge,134 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the Acts disparate treatment of states was
justified by current needs.135 Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion with a recitation of tenets enunciated in Northwest Austin:[T]he Act imposes current burdens
and must be j
ustified by current needssuch that a departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showingthat a statutes disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.136 Justice Roberts reiterated the pertinence of the principle of equal sovereignty throughout the opinion.137
To a majority of the Court, the VRA offended this principle by compellingcertain
states to gain federal approval for internal legislation otherwise within their sovereign
authority.138 The Court stressed the comparative inequity of preclearance, noting
covered jurisdictions needed federal approval for laws that noncovered jurisdictions
could pass without beseechingfederal approval.139
Addressingthe coverage formulas constitutionality, the Court noted that upon
the VRAs initial enactment in 1965, the reverse-engineered formula was rational
in both practice and theory.140 The Court, though, disapproved of the formulas
modern reliance on outdated data in consideration of the monumental improvements
in minority electoral participation witnessed since the 1960s.141 Congress if it is
to divide the States must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that
makes sense in light of current conditions.142 The Court rejected the governments
contention that the coverage formula remained valid since it deterred covered jurisdictions from implementingsecond-generation barriers to minority participation:
Viewingthe preclearance requirements as targetingsuch [second-generation]efforts
simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the §4coverage formula,
which is based on votingtests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution.143 The Court
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679F.3d 848, 884(D.C. Cir. 2012);Shelby Cnty. v. Holder,
811F. Supp. 2d 424, 508(D.D.C. 2011).
135
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612, 2619(2013).
136
Id. at 2622(quotingNw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 203
(2009)).
137
Id. at 2623(Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also
a fundamental principle of equal sovereigntyamongthe States.);id. at 2624([A]s we
made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly
pertinent in assessingsubsequent disparate treatment of States.);id. at 2623(Over a hundred
years ago, this Court explained that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power,
dignity and authority.);id. (Indeed, the constitutional equality of the States is essential
to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.).
138
Id. at 2624.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 2627(quotingSouth Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 330(1966)).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 2629.
143
Id.
134
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thus stonewalled the various justifications that had enabled preclearance to survive
past challenges.
After notingCongresss failure to amend the coverage formula followingNorthwest Austins ominous dicta, the Court held the Section 4(b)coverage formula unconstitutional.144 While the Court did not rule on Section 5s constitutionality,145 by
strikingthe coverage formula, the Court effectively nullified preclearance as well.
Section 5s statutory configuration requires a coverage formula to demarcate its application.146 Without a coverage formula, preclearance does not apply to any jurisdiction. Thus, Shelby County released all covered jurisdictions from preclearance.
Since the Court did not rule on Section 5s constitutionality, application of preclearance can resume if Congress can draft another formula outfitted for the modern
era. In early 2014, a bipartisan group of congressional representatives introduced a
bill containinga new coverage formula for the VRA.147However, the Court cautioned
that Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks
to current conditions.148 For now, the nation wades into a novel electoral situation.
Some formerly covered j
urisdictions have never exercised full electoral autonomy in
an era where racial equality is the societal norm. Whether the practical elimination
of preclearance will generate a new wave of discriminatory votinglaws remains an
open question. Since Shelby County, some formerly covered states have passed laws
that likely would have failed to achieve preclearance. In Texas and North Carolina,
civil rights groups are challengingpostShelby County voter ID requirements under
Section 2of the VRA.149
II. THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
A. Development of the Equal Footing Doctrine
Shelby Countys designation of the equal sovereignty principleis a misnomer.
The principle the Court purports to reference, based on its citation to Coyle v. Smith,
is better recognized throughout federal jurisprudence as the equal footingdoctrine.150
Id. at 2631.
Id.
146
See 42U.S.C. §1973c (2006)(Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a)of this title based upon determinations
made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title . . . .(emphasis added)).
147
Ari Berman, Members of Congress Introduce a New Fix for the Voting Rights Act, THE
NATION (Jan. 16, 2014),http:
/
/
www.thenation.com/
blog/
177962/
members-congress-introduce
-new-fix-voting-rights-act#.
148
Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2631.
149
Jaime Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby County, WASH.POST (July 7, 2014),
http:
/
/
www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/
the-fix/
wp/
2014/
07/
07/
how-has-voting-changed-since
-shelby-county-v-holder/
.
150
See Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2623(Over a hundred years ago, this Court explained
144
145
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The equal footingdoctrine generally stipulates that a state, upon its admission to the
Union, is on equal footingwith all other states and entitled to the same sovereign
powers held by existingstates.151 The doctrine protects statessovereignty by minimizingCongresss ability to impose inequitable terms of admission on states through
acts conferringstatehood.152
The Constitution references neither equal footingnor equal sovereignty of states.153
The Constitutional Congress of 1787contemplated includinga constitutional provision mandatingstates to be admitted on the same terms with the original states,but
the phrase was omitted from the final text.154 The equal footingphrase did appear
in early American legislation, notably the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.155The ordinance stipulated that states created from territory ceded by Virginia to the federal government would join the Union with the same sovereign rights as existingstates.156
The Northwest Ordinance, originally passed before the Constitution was finalized, was
reauthorized in 1789followingthe Constitutions adoption.157
In 1796, Congress used the equal footingphrase in the act admittingTennessee
to the Union. Tennessee thereby joined the United States on an equal footingwith
original states in all respects whatever.158 Since Tennessees admission, the equal
that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.(quoting
Coyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559, 567(1911))).
151
See Robert Barrett, History on an Equal Footing: Ownership of the Western Federal
Lands, 68U. COLO. L. REV. 761, 77071(1997).
152
See Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism
Implications of a 1990s States Rights Battle, 32GONZ. L. REV. 417, 462 (1997)(The
reasoningbehind this doctrine is both preserving new statesability to exercise all of its
powers under the Constitution and preventingCongress from enlargingits own authority by
imposingconditions on new statessovereignty.).
153
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 1(New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union;but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State;nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.).
154
Valerie J. M. Brader, Congress Pet: Why the Clean Air Acts Favoritism of California
Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVTL. L.
& POLY 119, 130, 132(2007).
155
Id. at 133. Justice OConnor disclosed the equal footingdoctrines common law foundation in Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, 482U.S. 193, 19596(1987).Under
English common law, the Kingpossessed title to all submerged lands under navigable water
as a sovereign attribute. Upon achievingindependence, the Thirteen Colonies inherited title
to submerged lands under navigable waters within their borders as part of the succession of
sovereignty from the British monarchy. Id.
156
See John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3BAYLOR L. REV. 519,
523(1951).
157
Id.
158
Southwell, supra note 152, at 461(quotingFRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 6THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3414(
1906)).
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footingphrase (or the equivalent same footingwording)has appeared in the text
or title of every subsequent enablingact admittinga state to the Union. 159
B. Supreme Court Application of the Equal Footing Doctrine
In 1831, a Supreme Court Justice first referenced the equal footingdoctrine.160
In a concurringopinion, Justice Henry Baldwin remarked that new states were to
be admitted into the union on an equal footingwith the original states;of course, not
shorn of their powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction within the boundaries assigned
by congress to the new states.161 The first maj
ority Court opinion to acknowledge the
doctrine was Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas in 1835.162
Pollard v. Hagan163 was the equal footingdoctrines first leadingrole, and the
decision expounded the doctrines constitutional underpinning.164Pollard concerned
competingclaims of title to submerged land in Alabama.165 The plaintiff claimed title
through a patent issued by the United States government in 1836, while the defendant
argued rightful title under a grant recognized in 1795by Georgias legislature prior to
Georgias cession of territory that would eventually form Alabama.166 Rejectingthe
plaintiffs claim, the Court explained that [w]hen Alabama was admitted into the
union, on an equal footingwith the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domainas held by existingstates.167 Since
Georgias cession of the territory that came to form Alabama was made on the condition that any state created from that land would stand on equal footingwith existingstates, Article IV, Section Three of the Constitution obliged the Court to honor
Georgias intent in grantingthe territory.168 Alabamas admission on an equal footingthus gave it exclusive control of its territory and precluded federal grants of its
territory.169 Permoli v. New Orleans further cemented the equal footingdoctrines
Id.;see also Brader, supra note 154, at 13435.
Brader, supra note 154, at 136.
161
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30U.S. (5Pet.)1, 35(1831)(Baldwin, J., concurring).
162
Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34U.S. 224, 235(1835)(This article obviously
contemplates two objects. One, that Louisiana shall be admitted into the union as soon as
possible, upon an equal footingwith the other states . . . .).
163
44U.S. (3How.)212(1845).
164
See Brader, supra note 154, at 139n.100.
165
Id. at 139.
166
Pollard, 44U.S. at 214, 218.
167
Id. at 223.
168
Id. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3(New states may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union;but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State;nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.).
169
Pollard, 44U.S. at 22829;see also Barrett, supra note 151, at 783(The linchpin of
anti-federal arguments is Pollard v. Hagan . . . .);Hanna, supra note 156, at 531(The
159
160
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protection of state sovereignty.170Permoli held Louisianas admission to the Union on
an equal footingwith the original states, in all respects whatever,entitled it to sovereign control over subjects not expressly regulated by federal law or the Constitution.171
After Pollard and Permoli, the Court intermittently utilized the equal footingdoctrine for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The doctrine mostly was associated
with title disputes between states and the federal government,172 though it was pressed
into newfound situations too. The infamous Dred Scott decision, for instance, referenced the doctrine in a discussion about the comparative rights of states.173
Another nineteenth century case featuringthe doctrine likewise reflected the eras
underlyingracial inequity. Ward v. Race Horse involved a Native American prosecuted for violatinga Wyominghuntingstatute.174 Prior to Wyomings admission to
the Union, Race Horses tribe had formed a treaty with the federal government allowingfor broad huntingprivileges over federal land in exchange for the tribes agreement to settle on a reservation.175 Upon achievingstatehood, Wyomings legislature
imposed huntingregulations in contravention to privileges in the tribes treaty.176 In
upholdingRace Horses prosecution, the Court reasoned that Wyomingacquired control over all its territory upon achievingstatehood, and the state was within its sovereign rights to impose huntingregulations irrespective of the treaty. 177 To recognize
otherwise, the Court asserted, would deny Wyomingadmission on an equal footing.178
theory of the Court [in Pollard]was that the eminent domain, as an element of sovereignty,
belonged exclusively to the states.).
170
44U.S. (3How.)589, 607(1845).
171
Id.
172
See, e.g., id. at 609;Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 7, 27, 34 (1894);Sands v.
Manistee River Improvement Co., 123U.S. 288, 296(1887);Van Brocklin v. Tennessee,
117U.S. 151, 16768(1886);Escanaba & Lake Michigan Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107U.S.
678, 68889(1883).
173
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60U.S. (19How.)393, 461(1856)(Has the law of Illinois
any greater force within the jurisdiction of Missouri, than the laws of the latter within that
of the former?Certainly not. They stand upon an equal footing. Neither has any force extraterritorially, except what may be voluntarily conceded to them.);see also James Blacksher
& Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional
Right to Vote: Shelby County v. Holder, 8HARV. L. & POLY REV. 39(2014).
174
163U.S. 504, 507(1896).
175
Id. at 50809.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 51416.
178
The enablingact declares that the State of Wyomingis admitted on equal
terms with the other States, and this declaration, which is simply an
expression of the general rule, which presupposes that States, when admitted into the Union, are endowed with powers and attributes equal in
scope to those enjoyed by the States already admitted, repels any presumption that in this particular case Congress intended to admit the
State of Wyomingwith diminished governmental authority.
Id. at 51415.
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The early twentieth century witnessed several significant decisions in the equal
footingcanon. Stearns v. Minnesota179 demarcated a split in the equal footingdoctrines protection of political and territorial sovereignty.180 Stearns held Congress
could impose limitations on statesterritorial sovereignty through enabling acts,
since a mere agreement in reference to property involves no question of equality
of status.181 But Stearns stipulated the equal footingdoctrine may forbid any agreement or compact limitingor qualifyingpolitical rights and obligations.182
Nearly a decade later, the Court showcased the equal footingdoctrines staunch
protection of political sovereignty. Coyle v. Smith posited a challenge to Oklahomas
legislative reassignment of the states capital city from Guthrie to Oklahoma City.183
Oklahomas enablingact had mandated Guthrie was to serve as the state capitol until
1913, after which the states citizens would choose the capital city by popular vote.184
But the state legislature moved the capital on its own initiative in 1910.185 Coyles
principal issue concerned the validity of this legislative transplantation made in contravention to an enablingact restriction.186The Court sided with Oklahoma, as [t]he
power to locate its own seat of government . . . is essentially and peculiarly [a]state
power[].187 In potent language, Coyle provided the most loquacious articulation of
the equal footingdoctrines purport to date:
This Unionwas and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
itself. To maintain otherwise would be to say that the Union,
through the power of Congress to admit new States, might come
to be a union of States unequal in power, as includingStates whose
powers were restricted only by the Constitution, with others whose
powers had been further restricted by an act of Congress accepted
as a condition of admission. Thus it would result, first, that the
powers of Congress would not be defined by the Constitution
alone, but in respect to new states, enlarged or restricted by the
conditions imposed upon new states by its own legislation admittingthem into the Union;and, second, that such new States might
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

179U.S. 223(1900).
See Brader, supra note 154, at 142.
Stearns, 179U.S. at 245.
Id.
221U.S. 559, 563(1911).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 565.
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not exercise all of the powers which had not been delegated by
the Constitution, but only such as had not been further bargained
away as conditions of admission.188
The Court mustered the equal footingdoctrine to resolve a groupingof midtwentieth century title disputes between states and the federal government. United
States v. Texas189was a showdown over offshore resources in the Gulf of Mexico. 190
The Court held resources beyond the low-water mark involve national interests and
national responsibilities,191 and enjoined Texas from harvestingresources outside
its inland water.192 The decision atypically applied the doctrine as a limitation on
state, rather than federal, power. The equal footingclause prevents extension of
the sovereignty of a State into a domain of political and sovereign power of the
United States from which the other States have been excluded, just as it prevents a
contraction of sovereignty which would produce inequality amongthe States.193
United States v. Louisiana194similarly involved a disagreement between the federal
government and states over Gulf resources.195 The Court rejected the argument that
the equal footingdoctrine compelled extension of equal seaward boundaries for all
Gulf states.196 In the tradition of Stearns, property rights as an attribute of sovereignty
did not warrant the equal footingdoctrines unconditional protection.197
In the second half of the twentieth century, plaintiffs deployed equal footing
arguments in a host of backdrops, both familiar and novel. Disputes over title to land
remained a common settingfor the doctrine.198 But the doctrine was summoned in
less conventional domains too, includingchallenges to congressional designation
of a nuclear depository199 and a polygamy prohibition.200
Id. at 567. Justice Roberts quoted much of this paragraph from Coyle in explicatingthe
equal sovereignty principle in Shelby County. See supra note 137.
189
339U.S. 707(1950).
190
Id. at 709.
191
Id. at 719.
192
Id. at 720.
193
Id. at 71920(citations omitted).
194
363U.S. 1(1960).
195
Id. at 45.
196
Id. at 7677.
197
See supra notes 17982and accompanyingtext.
198
See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482U.S. 193(1987).
199
Nevada v. Watkins, 914F.2d 1545, 1555(9th Cir. 1990)([T]he equal footingdoctrine
is not a restriction on Congresspower to enact regulations concerningthe sitingof a national
nuclear waste repository pursuant to the Property Clause.).
200
Potter v. Murray City, 760F.2d 1065, 106768(10th Cir. 1985)(holdingplaintiffs
claim that the provision of Utahs enablingact forbiddingpolygamy violated equal footing
doctrine lacked merit because state had power to subsequently legalize polygamy upon achievingstatehood).
188
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The equal footingdoctrine was largely foreign to election litigation through the
twentieth century.201 Katzenbach notably rejected application of the equal footing
doctrine to VotingRights Act litigation to the effect that the doctrines applicability
in that context seemed foreclosed.202 In Katzenbach, the Court succinctly dismissed
South Carolinas equal footing challenge to the preclearance regime, explaining
The doctrine of the equality of States . . . applies only to the terms upon which
States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have
subsequently appeared.203
Not until Northwest Austin,204 over forty years after Katzenbach, did the Court
assign any constitutional heft to the equal footingdoctrine in the context of VRA
litigation. Northwest Austin cited equal footingprecedent in dicta questioningthe
coverage formulas constitutionality.205 [A]departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showingthat a statutes disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.206 Though referringto
equal sovereignty, Northwest Austin supported its assertions with citations to the equal
footingcases of United States v. Louisiana207 and Texas v. White.208 Those cases,
though, pertained to circumstances relatingto enablingacts.209 Northwest Austin
strategically cited language from Katzenbach, reiteratingthat, The doctrine of the
equality of States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.210Omitted was language qualifyingthe equal footingdoctrines
applicability to the context of state admissions.211
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 32829(1966).
Id.
203
Id. (citingCoyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559(1911)).
204
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193(2009).
205
Id. at 203.
206
Id.
207
363U.S. 1(1960). See supra notes 19497and accompanyingtext.
208
74U.S. (7Wall.)700(1869). Texas v. White loosely pertained to the equal footing
doctrine. The case concerned the validity of a sale of U.S. bonds by the Texan confederate
government. The opinion discussed the nature of the Union, but does not explicitly reference
the equal footingof states. See id. at 725.
209
See 363U.S. at 66. United States v. Louisiana is somewhat comparable to Northwest
Austin in that Louisiana objected to differential treatment amongstates, specifically the more
extensive seaward boundaries afforded to Texas and Florida. Id. at 7677. The case diverges
from Northwest Austin, though, in that the extended boundaries of Texas and Florida were
granted as part of their terms of admission into the United States. Id. Subjugation to preclearance assuredly was not a term of Texass admission to the Union.
210
Nw. Austin, 557U.S. at 203(quotingSouth Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301,
32829(1966))(alterations in original).
211
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 32829 (1966)(The doctrine of the
equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies
for local evils which have subsequently appeared.).
201
202
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C. Shelby County and its Equal Sovereignty Principle
In Shelby County,212 the Court sunk in the dagger so thinly veiled in Northwest
Austins dicta. Shelby County lionized the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
as though it was constitutional text.213While there is some appeal to an idea of equal
sovereignty amongstates, particularly from a federalist perspective, the equal footing
doctrine does not posit a principle of equal sovereignty outside the context of states
terms of admission, and even that tenet is qualified.214
In her Shelby County dissent, Justice Ginsburglambasted the Courts utilization
of the equal footingdoctrine. 215 Justice Ginsburgpointed to multiple instances of
congressional legislation differentiatingamongst states outside the context of states
admittance.216 Justice Ginsburgfurther accentuated that Katzenbach had explicitly
rebuffed the doctrines applicability as a challenge to the coverage formula, questioninghow the maj
ority could postulate such a glaringinconsistency to j
ustify overruling
a congressional act:
If the Court is suggestingthat dictum in Northwest Austin silently
overruled Katzenbachs limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to the admission of new States,the suggestion is untenable. Northwest Austin cited Katzenbachs holdingin the course
of declining to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or
even what standard of review applied to the question. In todays
decision, the Court ratchets up what was pure dictum in Northwest
Austin, attributingbreadth to the equal sovereignty principle in
flat contradiction of Katzenbach. The Court does so with nary an
explanation of why it finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels adherence
to Katzenbachs rulingon the limited significanceof the equal
sovereignty principle.217
Justice Roberts fleetingly acknowledged Shelby Countys irregularity with precedent. He mentioned Coyle involved a matter of state admission, and ceded Katzenbach
had declined to extend the equal footingdoctrine outside the realm of state admissions.218 But Roberts, as Ginsburgnoted, largely sidestepped the issue by reachingto
Northwest Austins dicta.219[A]s we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612(2013).
Id. at 2622(quotingNw. Austin, 557U.S. at 203).
214
Stearns v. Minnesota, 179U.S. 223, 245(1900)(stipulatingthat the equal footingdoctrine
may forbid any agreement or compact limitingor qualifyingpolitical rights and obligations).
215
Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 264849(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216
Id. at 2649(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
218
Id. at 262324.
219
Id. at 2624.
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principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessingsubsequent disparate treatment of States.220
The Chief Justice is simply wronghere. Congress cannot abridge statescomparative political equality through restrictions imposed in enablingacts, but there
is not a recognized constitutional doctrine prohibitingCongress from differentiating
amongst the states through legislation after their admission to the Union. Such differentiation is relatively common.221 But Shelby County not only insisted an equal
sovereignty principle exists, the decision utilized this chimerical canon to annul a
legislative regime that had effectively enfranchised millions of Americans and debilitated the institutionalized plague of racial discrimination in voting.
III. A PROSPECTIVE EXPLANATION FOR SHELBY COUNTYS
RELIANCE ON THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
As discussed, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty222 is not a recognized doctrine in U.S. jurisprudence.223 The equal footing doctrine is a principle
inhibitingcongressional debasement of state sovereignty through conditions in enablingacts,224 but the doctrine lacks the gravitas attributed to it in Shelby County.225
Shelby Countys equal sovereignty principle thus is a doctrinal bastardization at best,
afforded precedential support only through omission and tactful editing.
The unavoidable question beseeched by Shelby County is why the Court chose
the equal footingdoctrine to strike down the VRAs coverage formula?An amalgamation of three factors proffers a prospective explanation. First, precedent constricted
the Courts ability to annul the VRAs coverage formula usingmore conventional
constitutional tenets. Second, the equal footingdoctrine supplied a flexible axiom
for the Court to fashion into ostensive justification for its holding. Finally, the equal
footingdoctrine served as a façade for an ideological philosophy advocatingthe dignity of states as political sovereigns.
A. Precedential Restriction of the Courts Ability to Annul the Coverage Formula
Precedent upholdingpreclearances framework likely necessitated the Courts
embrace of a doctrine largely remote to VRA litigation in order to defeat the coverage
Id.
See supra note 216and accompanyingtext.
222
Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2623.
223
See supra Part II.C.
224
See Coyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559, 573(1911)([W]hen a new State is admitted into
the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain
to the original States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired
or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which
the new State came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of
congressional legislation after admission.).
225
See Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. at 2623.
220
221
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formula. The equal footingdoctrine offered a relatively untarnished doctrinal vantage
from which the Court could attack the disfavored coverage formula.
Beginningwith Katzenbach, the Court assumed a highly deferential posture
toward Congresss authority to implement and reauthorize the VRA.226 Any argument that states retained sovereign primacy over electoral affairs under the Tenth
Amendment227 was summarily repudiated.228 As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.229 From the VRAs inception, the Court
evaluated challenges to the preclearance regime with a rational basis standard that
foreclosed constitutional challenges based on the Tenth Amendment.230
For four decades after Katzenbach, the Court consistently guarded the VRA
with robust language dismissive of federalism concerns inherent in the Acts structure. City of Rome indicated the Courts deference to Congress had not waned with
time.231 In City of Rome, federalisms principles were necessarily overridden by
[Congresss]power to enforce the Civil War Amendments by appropriate legislation.232 Through the 1990s, the Court remained unquestioningof the VRAs intrusion onto state sovereignty.233
Northwest Austin indicated a shiftingattitude on the Court, though. Principles of
federalism materialized as a counter to preclearances intrusiveness.234But precedent
effectively insulated the preclearance regime from constitutional assailment under
traditional strains of federalist argument. If the Court was to strike preclearance or
its coverage formula, it would need to do so on grounds not conclusively refuted by
See Paul, supra note 19, at 278.
See Boyd v. Nebraska, 143U.S. 135, 161(1892)(Each State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen, and the
title to offices shall be tried, whether in the judicial courts or otherwise.).
228
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 325(1966)(The gist of the matter is that
the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power. When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial
review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for
circumventinga federally protected right.(quotingGomillion v. Lightfoot, 364U.S. 339,
347(1960))).
229
Id. at 324.
230
See Paul, supra note 19, at 278.
231
See City of Rome v. United States, 446U.S. 156, 182(1980)(Congressconsidered
determination that at least another 7years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter
the perpetuation of 95years of pervasive votingdiscrimination is both unsurprisingand
unassailable. The extension of the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing
the Fifteenth Amendment.).
232
Id. at 179.
233
See Lopezv. Monterey Cnty., 525U.S. 266, 284(1999)(In short, the VotingRights
Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty.).
234
Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557U.S. 193, 202(2009)(discussingfederalism costs instituted by the VRA).
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precedent. The equal footingdoctrine, cloaked as the principle of equal sovereignty,
afforded a moderately intact avenue for the Court to debase the preclearance regime
without gratingforty years of precedent.
Katzenbach undeniably rejected an equal footingargument in the context of preclearance litigation.235 But after Katzenbachs succinct dismissal, the equal footing
doctrine laid dormant in the realm of preclearance litigation. Challengers to preclearance likely considered the doctrine a fruitless avenue for underminingpreclearance
on account of Katzenbachs terse dismissal. Or perhaps challengers were cognizant of
the doctrines appropriate context. Regardless, the doctrine proved decisive in Shelby
County as precedential backingfor the equal sovereignty principle. The Court likely
assigned constitutional gravitas to the equal footingdoctrine partly because the doctrine
had a diminutive history in VRA litigation. Unlike other federalist-strain arguments,236
the Court had not repetitively rej
ected the doctrine as a constraint on the preclearance
regimes constitutionality. A single sentence from Katzenbach was the only precedent
explicitly denyingthe equal footingdoctrines suitability in preclearance litigation.237
Thus, the doctrine likely enticed the Court in its pursuit of doctrinal justification underminingthe preclearance regime.
In sum, it is likely that Shelby County roused the equal footingdoctrine because
it was one of the few channels of argument not resoundingly foreclosed by precedent.
So longas the Court ignored context and brushed aside a sentence of precedent, the
doctrine furnished a facial restriction on Congresss capacity to impose disparate obligations on states.
B. The Equal Footing Doctrines Flexibility
The equal footing doctrines pliability may further explain Shelby Countys
reliance on it. The doctrine has touched a comprehensive range of subject matter,
239
240
includingissues of title;238 ownership of bonds;
corporate taxbreaks;
a treaty
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383U.S. 301, 32829(1966).
See Lopez, 525U.S. at 283([W]e have specifically upheld the constitutionality of §5
of the Act against a challenge that this provision usurps powers reserved to the States.);City
of Rome, 446U.S. at 179([P]rinciples of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to
congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments by appropriate legislation.Those Amendments were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.);Katzenbach, 383U.S.
at 325(The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions
of state power.).
237
See supra note 203and accompanyingtext.
238
See United States v. Louisiana, 363U.S. 1, 2223(1960);United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707, 71321(1950);Pollard v. Hagan, 44U.S. (3How.)212, 22324(1845).
239
See Texas v. White, 74U.S. (7Wall.)700(1869). Texas v. White loosely pertained to
the equal footingdoctrine. See supra note 208.
240
See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179U.S. 223, 24344(1900).
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with Native Americans;241 transplantation of a state capitol;242 even slavery.243
Stearns244 further gave the territorial aspect of sovereignty protected by the doctrine
less fortitude than its political counterpart.245 Thus, even within its proper context,
the equal footingdoctrine has stood for different ideals, such that its true import is
somewhat obscured.
Though the factual backdrop to the equal footing doctrines application has
varied over time, until Northwest Austin and Shelby County, the doctrines function
always pertained in some degree to statesterms of admission. But if this lone constancy in application is bypassed, the equal footingdoctrine ostensibly presents a
general restraint on Congresss ability to impose dissimilar obligations on states.
Shelby County seems to have cherry-picked the doctrines functional restriction on
Congress, while disregarding the doctrines crucial contextual relation to matters
pertainingto state admissions.
Shelby Countys strategically worded quotation from Coyle lends credence to
the proposition of selective interpretation. Over a hundred years ago, this Court
explained that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority.246 The subsequent sentence in Coyle, tactfully omitted by Chief Justice
Roberts, qualified the precedingassertion of state equality to the context of state
admissions.247 Examination of Shelby Countys citations thereby buttresses the insinuation that the Court customized the relatively pliable equal footingdoctrine into
a vehicle for its equal sovereignty principle.
C. The Equal Footing Doctrine as a Mask for a State Sovereignty Doctrine
A final consideration relevant to Shelby Countys use of the equal footingdoctrine implicates the ideology of some members of the Court. While Shelby County
cited equal footingprecedent, the Court may have created a new constitutional doctrine entirely. Amongsome conservative scholars, the ideal of the statesdignity as
See Ward v. Race Horse, 163U.S. 504, 51014(1896).
See Coyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559(1911).
243
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60U.S. (19How.)393, 461(1856).
244
179U.S. 223(1900).
245
See id. at 245;supra note 214and accompanyingtext.
246
See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612, 2623(2013)(quotingCoyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559, 567(1911)).
247
Coyles next sentence qualifies the previous assertion:
To maintain otherwise would be to say that the Union, through the power
of Congress to admit new States, might come to be a union of States
unequal in power, as includingStates whose powers were restricted
only by the Constitution, with others whose powers had been further
restricted by an act of Congress accepted as a condition of admission.
Coyle, 221U.S. at 567.
241
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sovereigns is esteemed as a lost tenet in the structure of American government.248
As Joseph Fishkin details in The Dignity of the South, the theory of state dignity
fundamentally demands respect for states as sovereign entities distinct from the collective Union.249The theory is not substantiated by constitutional text, but purportedly
engrained in the American system of dual sovereignty.250
In accordance with the theory of state dignity, preclearance violated statesdignity
through the federal governments seizure of a traditional aspect of state sovereignty:
the power to regulate elections.251 Some proponents of state dignity contend that since
the end of the Civil War, the federal government has steadily usurped sovereign power
from the South. These state dignity theorists thus consider Congresss continued
subjugation of Southern states to rigorous federal oversight as debasingthose states
dignity as sovereigns.252
William Rehnquist is regarded as the Courts modern foreman of state dignity.253
The Rehnquist Revolutionof the 1990s began to stanchion the concept of state
dignity, as Court decisions from this period often departed from the twentieth century
trend of j
udicial deference to Congress.254Rehnquists Court refuted the constitutionality of federal legislation rangingfrom gun regulations255 to civil remedies for victims
of gender-related crimes.256 Rhetoric from these decisions evinced the Courts high
regard for state dignity257:The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to
accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.258
Rehnquists death in 2005did not extinguish the state dignityrenaissance. Contemporary decisions continue to reference the dignity of states, directly or tangentially, in
discussions on state sovereignty and the proper scope of congressional power.259
Columbia University historian William Dunningwas a prominent proponent of the
sovereign dignity of states around the turn of the 19th century. Dunningproliferated a contorted
account of the Civil War and its aftermath that characterized the Civil War and Reconstruction
as a campaign of federal oppression that had resulted in a flagrant appropriation of states
constitutional powers. Dunnings writings were distributed in American schools duringthe
formative years of some members of the current Supreme Court and may have influenced
their perceptions of sovereignty. See Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123YALE L.J.
ONLINE 175, 18386(2013).
249
See id. at 176.
250
See id. at 176, 187.
251
See id. at 17677.
252
See id. at 178.
253
See id. at 186.
254
See id.
255
United States v. Lopez, 514U.S. 549, 567(1995).
256
United States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598, 627(2000).
257
See, e.g., Printzv. United States, 521U.S. 898, 935(1997).
258
Fed. Mar. Commn v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535U.S. 743, 760(2002).
259
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132S. Ct. 2492, 2522(2012)(Scalia, J. dissenting)
(opiningthat if Arizona did not have sovereign authority to regulate state citizenship then the
Court should cease referringto it as a sovereign State).
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Justice Roberts, who once clerked for Rehnquist, penned the majority opinions in
both Northwest Austin and Shelby County. Both decisions stand as victories for state
dignity, and the principle is rhetorically embedded in both opinions.260
Though Shelby County conflated state dignity with the equal footingdoctrine, the
Court intentionally may have fused the concepts to supply precedential validation for
a broader conviction about the proper interplay between state and federal governments. Since state dignity is not a recognized constitutional doctrine, the Court likely
needed some precedential sustenance to back its convictions. The equal footingdoctrine furnished a relatively obscure doctrinal avenue that the Court could fashion into
a modern tenet requiringCongress to respect the sovereign domain of states. Citation
to equal footingprecedent thus only served as a precedential foundation. The Courts
choice to phrase the doctrine as the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
amongthe States,261instead of usingequal footinglanguage, strengthens the supposition that the Court is referencinga separate concept altogether.
If the Court has in fact created a new doctrine of state dignity, the enduringimplications could prove momentous. Congress certainly will have to consider a discrepant
impact on states in the conception of another VRA coverage formula;Shelby County
said as much.262 But the repercussions of such a doctrine may extend beyond the
confines of preclearance litigation. No qualifyinglanguage tempered Shelby Countys
declaration that the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessingsubsequent disparate treatment of States.263 It is not implausible
to construe that phrasingto mean any congressional legislation differentiatingamong
states must respect the principle of statessovereign dignity.
A state dignity doctrine could posit an obstacle to any congressional attempts
to implement legislation with variant impact on states. On the other hand, the Court
simply may have twisted precedent to annul an obsolete coverage formula it considered unfair in its modern application. After all, the Court did preserve the constitutionality of Section 5, which itself offends the concept of state dignity. Nonetheless,
Shelby Countys most meaningful consequence could be the origination of a constraint
on congressional authority based on the concept of statesdignity as sovereigns.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court misapplied the equal footingdoctrine as justification for
strikingthe VotingRights Acts coverage formula. Shelby County displaced the equal
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133S. Ct. 2612, 2623(2012)(Over a hundred years ago, this
Court explained that our Nation was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority.(quotingCoyle v. Smith, 221U.S. 559, 567(1911)));id. (This allocation of
powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the
States.(quotingBond v. United States, 131S. Ct. 2355, 2364(2011))).
261
Id. at 2623.
262
Id. at 2624.
263
Id.
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footing doctrine from its proper context in order to provide a doctrinal limitation on
Congresss capacity to enact legislation with discrepant impact on states. It is highly
improbable that the Shelby County majority, composed of some of the nations preeminent constitutional scholars, was heedless to the decisions irregularity with precedent.
There is indication the Court may have fashioned the equal footing doctrine into
an entirely new mechanism cabining Congresss power to enact legislation incongruently impacting states. Regardless of whether the Court was correct to invalidate the
VRAs coverage formula, it is disconcerting to know that the nations highest judicial
body largely invented a judicial doctrine to annul federal legislation it considered
outdated and inequitable.
Whether Shelby Countys equal sovereignty principle will persist as a doctrinal
constraint on Congress is uncertain. More definitive is the effective end of preclearance
as a mechanism for protecting minority voting rights, and Shelby County has delivered
many states a level of electoral autonomy last seen in the days of Jim Crow.

